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Abstract—The rising concern for privacy protection and the 
associated legal and social responsibilities have led to extensive 
research into the field of face de-identification over the last 
decade. To date, the most successful algorithms developed for 
face de-identification are those based on the k-Same de-
identification, which guarantee a recognition rate lower than 1/k. 
However, the current k-Same solutions such as k-Same-Eigen and 
k-Same-M all rely on a decent value of k to deliver a good privacy 
protection. This paper proposes a departure from a fundamental 
aspect shared by the current k-Same solutions and thereby 
introduces a new member to the family which achieves perfect 
privacy protection for any original face regardless of the value of 
k. 
Keywords—privacy protection, face de-identification, active 
appearance model, k-Same, k-anonymity. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Recent advances in both camera technology and computing 
hardware have highly facilitated the effectiveness and 
efficiency of image and video acquisition. This capability is 
now widely used in a variety of scenarios to capture images of 
people in target environments, either for immediate inspection 
or for storage and subsequent analysis/sharing [1]. These 
improved recording capabilities, however, have ignited 
concerns about the privacy of people identifiable in the scenes. 
The Council of Europe Convention of 1950 formally declared 
privacy protection as a human right. This was later embodied 
in the 1995 Data Protection Directive of the European Union 
(Directive 95/46/EC), which demands the deployment of 
appropriate technical and organizational measures to protect 
private information in the course of transferring or processing 
such data. This legal requirement along with ethical 
responsibilities has restricted data sharing and utilization while 
various organizations may require the use of such data for 
research, business, academic, security and many other 
purposes. To comply with the regulations, de-identification has 
become the focus of attention by many organizations with the 
ultimate goal of removing all personal identifying information 
while protecting the utility of the data. 
Various methods have been proposed for the de-
identification of faces in still and moving images. These 
methods can be put into two categories: the ad hoc methods 
(such as masking, pixelation and blurring [2-4] and the k-
anonymity based methods (such as k-Same proposed by 
Newton et al. [5]). The ad hoc methods are usually simple to 
implement. However, they fail to serve their purpose as they 
are unable to thwart the existing face recognition software [5, 
6]. To achieve privacy protection, the concept of k-anonymity 
was introduced by Sweeney in 2002 [7]. All k-anonymity based 
methods de-identify k original samples with an identical 
aggregate sample and hence achieve privacy protection with a 
recognition rate guaranteed to be lower than 1/k. In the field of 
face de-identification, the most widely used family of k-
anonymity algorithms is k-Same [5]. However, all existing k-
Same solutions share a drawback which makes them all 
produce a recognition rate just below the theoretical maximum 
of 1/ while the new k-Same solution proposed in this paper 
achieves a recognition rate of zero. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 
2 reviews the k-Same framework and points out the drawback 
shared by all existing k-Same solutions. Section 3 describes a 
new k-Same solution and proves that this new solution can 
always achieve zero recognition rate. Section 4 evaluates the 
proposed algorithm’s ability to protect privacy and compares it 
to that of the existing k-Same solutions. Finally, the findings of 
this work are summarized and further discussed in Section 5.  
II. K-SAME DE-IDENTIFICATION 
A. Definition of k-Same De-identification 
For the purpose of comparison with Newton et al.’s paper 
on k-Same [5], the same notations are used in this paper. The 
definition of k-Same de-identification from their paper is 
repeated here. 
Definition 1 k-Same (Definition 2.10 in [5]). Given a 
person-specific face set  ; and a face set   which is k-
anonymized over   using a preserved face de-identification 
function : →  , if  is effective with respect to the claim: 
Given any face image Γ = Γ	for	Γ ∈ , there cannot 
exist any face recognition software for which the subject of Γ 
can be correctly recognized as Γ  with better than 1/ 
probability.  
Person-specific face set in Definition 1 means that the face 
set contains only one face image of each person. A de-
identification method : →   is said to be preserved if it 
minimizes the information loss measured by a precision metric 
Γ, Γ. The k-Same de-identification guarantees to be 
effective with respect to the claim in Definition 1 since it adds 
k copies of each Γ to . 
B. The Common Drawback of Existing k-Same Solutions 
To achieve k-anonymity, k-Same de-identification de-
identify each cluster of at least k original faces with the same 
aggregate face and hence the name k-Same. The core problem 
of k-Same de-identification is to find the optimal selection of 
faces from the original face set to form the clusters of k faces. 
In [5] it is claimed that “basing each aggregate face on a cluster 
of homogeneous original faces minimizes information loss”. 
This claim is correct. However, all existing k-Same de-
identification solutions share a common mistake when deciding 
which face cluster of homogeneous faces to be selected to de-
identify a given face. They all select a cluster of faces that are 
closest to the original, implying that the loss to be minimized 
or the information to be preserved is the identities of the 
original faces. Obviously, this conflicts with the ultimate goal 
of k-Same which is privacy protection.  
The information that should be preserved in the de-
identified faces is the various data utilities such as gender, age 
and expressions. This means that the correct choice of 
Γ, Γ should be a data utility function measuring the 
category and/or the quantity of the target data utilities to be 
preserved.  To date, the most cited attempt on integrating utility 
preservation into face de-identification has been k-Same-Select 
[8]. Two data utility classifiers, a gender classifier and an 
expression classifier, are adopted in [8] for the purpose of 
preserving data utility. The utility classifiers are used to 
partition the original face set into mutually exclusive data 
utility subsets. Since the resultant utility subsets contain more 
than k faces each (half of the set has the same gender for 
example), the problem then becomes how to further divide 
each data utility subset into clusters of k. The k-Same-Select 
algorithm proposed in [8] has the same drawback as all the 
other existing k-Same solution, as it uses the closest faces to 
de-identify each original face. 
For the benefit of discussions in this paper, the k-Same 
solutions that de-identify an original face based on the faces 
that are closest to it are referred to as “k-Same-closest 
algorithms”. Examples of k-Same-closest algorithms include k-
Same-Pixels [5], k-Same-Eigen [5], k-Same-M [6] and k-Same-
Select [8]. In fact, k-Same-closest algorithms are the worst k-
Same solutions in terms of privacy protection. When no 
overlapping exists between any two clusters, the original face 
that is closest to the average/center of a cluster must lie within 
the cluster (see proof of Theorem 2 in the next section). The k-
Same-closest algorithms uses the center of a cluster to de-
identify the k faces in that cluster, meaning the algorithms will 
always lead to a recognition rate equal to the theoretical 
maximum of 1/ . When overlapping exists between two 
clusters the center of a cluster can be closest to an original face 
from the overlapping cluster (such as that demonstrated in Fig. 
1 where the inner cluster of 3,4,5 is formed earlier than the 
outer cluster 1,2,6 and the outer cluster has an average equal 
to a member of the inner cluster), giving k-Same-closest 
algorithms lucky escapes. However, when de-identification is 
performed to an original face instead of a face set the k-Same-
closest algorithms will never escape from the theoretical 
maximum and always generate the worst privacy protection 
within the k-anonymity framework. Even with a face set, 
experimental results (Fig. 6) show that the recognition rate of 
faces de-identified by the k-Same-closest algorithms always 
stays synchronized with the theoretical maximum of 1/ and 
force the k-Same-closest algorithms to use large k’s to achieve 
decent privacy protection. Large values of k will not only lead 
to the requirement of large image gallery for the de-
identification process but also to the discrimination issue with  
 
 
Fig. 1. Overlapping may occur between clusters of homogeneous faces when 
formed by a k-Same-closest algorithm. 
the de-identified faces. After all, there are k copies of each de-
identified face. 
III. THE PROPOSED FACE DE-IDENTIFICATION 
A. A Better k-Same Solution 
This section presents a new approach to face de-
identification, which repeats each de-identified face at least k 
times in the de-identified face set  and therefore is a k-Same 
solution. However, this new k-Same solution is fundamentally 
different to the existing k-Same-closest algorithms. To best 
serve its goal of privacy protection, the proposed solution 
performs clustering with the aim to maximize the removal/loss 
of identity information in the original faces. In contrast to k-
Same-closest which de-identifies an original face with the 
aggregate of the closest face cluster to it, it de-identifies each 
original face Γ ∈  with an aggregate face of a cluster that, 
identity-wise, is furthest away from it and is hence named k-
Same-furthest. 
This work calculates the average as the aggregate of k faces, 
although other measures can be used to perform the 
aggregation. The identity distance can be the pixel-wise 
Euclidean distance or the distance measured in a projected 
feature space such as the Eigenface space [9] or the feature 
space constructed by an Active Appearance Model (AAM) [10, 
11]. As pointed out in [6], k-Same is appearance based, 
operating entirely in the image space. As a result, ‘ghosting’ 
artefacts tend to appear due to the misalignments of the k 
images involved, even when images are aligned based on a 
small number of facial landmarks (e.g. the corners of the eyes 
and the tip of the nose). To prevent ghosting’ artefacts in the 
de-identified faces, this work performs averaging of faces in 
the feature space constructed by an AAM. In addition, the 
identity distance is measured in the feature space constructed 
by the same AAM such that construction/training of additional 
feature space(s) is avoided. Fig. 2 outlines the process flow of 
the proposed k-Same-furthest algorithm. 
 
Algorithm: k-Same-furthest(, ) 
Inputs: Face set  and privacy constraint , with ||  2 
 An Active Appearance Model ΑΑΜ 
Output: De-identified face set and its AAM projection " 
Uses: a face cluster #$ = Λ$ with a center at Λ$&&& and a radius of '$ , 
          a face cluster #( = Λ( with a center at Λ(&&& and a radius of '(, 
  and dist-Λ$&&&, Λ(&&&. which is the distance between Λ$&&& and Λ(&&&. 
Steps: 
1  = / 
2 " = ΑΑΜ  
3 For each Λ ∈ " do: 
4  If |"|  2 then: 
5  Add Λ  to #$ and remove it from " 
6  Λ$&&& = Λ , '$ = 0 
7  Select from " the face Λ(1 that is furthest away from Λ  
8  Add Λ(1 to #( and remove it from " 
9  Λ(&&& = Λ(1, '( = 0 
10  While |#$| <  and 3#(3 <  do 
11   Select from " the face Λ( that is closest to Λ(&&& 
12   Add Λ( to #( 
13   Update Λ(&&&, '( and dist-Λ$&&&, Λ(&&&.  
14   If dist-Λ$&&&, Λ(&&&. ≤ '$ + '( then  
15    Remove Λ( from #( 
16    Update Λ(&&& 
17    Break from while loop 
18   Endif 
19   Remove Λ( from " 
20   Select from " the face Λ$  that is closest to Λ$&&& 
21   Add Λ$  to #$ 
22   Update Λ$&&&, '$ and dist-Λ$&&&, Λ(&&&.  
23   If dist-Λ$&&&, Λ(&&&. ≤ '$ + '( then  
24    Remove Λ$  from #$ 
25    Update Λ$&&& 
26    Break from while loop 
27   Endif 
28   Remove Λ$  from " 
29  Loop 
30  If 3#(3 <  then 
31   Select from " the closest  − 3#(3 faces {Λ( to Λ(&&& 
32   Add {Λ( to #(, remove {Λ( from " 
33  Endif 
34  If |#$| <  then 
35   Select from " the closest  − |#$| faces {Λ$ to Λ$&&& 
36   Add {Λ$ to #$, remove {Λ$ from " 
37  Endif 
38  Add Λ(&&& to " to de-identify the faces in #$ 
39  Add Λ$&&& to " to de-identify the faces in #( 
40  else // remaining original faces 
41   If Λ  is further to Λ(&&&  than to Λ$&&& then 
42    Add Λ(&&& to " to de-identify 	Λ 
43   Else 
44    Add Λ$&&& to " to de-identify 	Λ 
45   Endif 
46  Endif 
47 Next 
48  = ΑΑΜ71" 
Fig. 2. The process flow of the proposed k-Same-furthest algorithm. 
 
Fig. 3. Results of an iteration of the proposed k-Same-furthest de-
identificaiton process on an example data set, where original samples Λ(1, Λ(8 
are de-identified as Ψ$  (the average of Λ$1  and Λ$8 ) and Λ$1, Λ$8  are de-
identified as Ψ( (the average of Λ(1 and Λ(8). Here  = 2. 
For a given face set  , the proposed k-Same-furthest 
projects  to the feature space constructed by a trained AAM 
(line 2) and generates " which is the AAM representation of 
the original face set. All the subsequent operations of de-
identification are performed in the AAM space, i.e. on " . 
Lines 5 through 39 in Fig. 2 define an iteration of the proposed 
de-identification process when there are more than 2  faces 
remaining in ". In each iteration the proposed k-Same-furthest 
algorithm de-identifies 2  original faces. Fig. 3 depicts the 
results of a de-identification iteration for an example data set 
when  = 2. To simplify illustration and ease understanding, a 
data set of scalars is used in Fig. 3. In Figs. 2 and 3, Λ  is the 
original face that triggers the de-identification process (line 3 in 
Fig. 2) and Λ(1 is the furthest face to Λ  (line 7). The cluster #$ 
consists of Λ  and another face Λ$ . The cluster #(  consists of 
Λ(1  and Λ( . Cluster #$  is formed by selecting from "  (the 
remaining original faces) the closest faces to Λ  (lines 20 and 
21) and hence the closest cluster of faces to Λ  that is available 
from ". Cluster #( is formed by selecting from " the closest 
faces to Λ(1 (lines 11 and 12) and hence the furthest cluster of 
faces to Λ  that is available from ". Cluster #$ may not be the 
closest cluster of faces to Λ  in the full face set but it is the 
closest among the remaining original faces that have not been 
de-identified or added to a cluster. The same holds for cluster 
#( . To cause identity loss, the proposed k-Same-furthest de-
identifies the members in a cluster with the center of the other 
cluster (Fig. 3 and lines 38 and 39 in Fig. 2). Since cluster #$ is 
identify-wise the closest cluster to Λ  and #( the furthest, they 
are identity-wise the furthest away from each other, meaning 
the proposed algorithm achieves maximum identity loss 
possible. 
To avoid members of a cluster become the closest original 
to the center of the other (i.e. the situation illustrated in Fig. 1), 
overlapping must be avoided between #$ and #(. Whenever a 
new member is added to a cluster, k-Same-furthest checks to 
see whether overlapping is caused by this new member (lines 
14 and 23). If so, this new member is removed from the cluster 
and the clustering loop for both #$  and #( is stopped, as this 
new member is the closest to the cluster and therefore adding 
any other remaining face to #$  or #( would cause even more 
overlapping between the two clusters. If clustering stopped 
before #$ and #( has been assigned k faces each, faces closest 
to the center of each cluster are selected and added to the 
cluster to fill up the gaps. However, the centers of #$ and #( 
are calculated using only those members that are added to them 
by the clustering process (i.e. before overlapping appears). 
 
Each iteration defined by lines 5 to 39 de-identifies 2 
faces. When || is not a multiple of 2, there will be fewer 
than 2 faces remaining in " (i.e. line 40 is true) after ||/
2) iterations. When this is the case, the operations defined by 
lines 41 to 45 are performed on each of the remaining faces. 
For a given remaining face from ", line 41 identifies which of 
the last formed two face clusters is further to it. Then it is de-
identified as the center of the further cluster (line 42 or 44), 
generating the maximize identity loss. 
It is assumed in this work that there is no specific data 
utility to be preserved by the de-identification process. If there 
is a simultaneous requirement on the preservation of data 
utility, extra steps must be taken and there are two options. 
Option one is the approach adopted in [10], which involves the 
use of a data utility classifier. The original face set is first 
partitioned into subsets using the data utility classifier. The k-
Same-furthest process is then performed on each utility subset. 
Option two performs k-Same-furthest face de-identification 
without consideration of data utility preservation and then 
restores the lost utility on the de-identified face generated by k-
Same-furthest. The second option has been tested by the work 
presented in [12]. 
B. Correctness of the k-Same-furthest Algorithm 
Theorem 1. If  is a person-specific face set,  is a privacy 
constraint, 	 = k-Same-furthest,  ,  > 1 , and || 
2, then  satisfies k-anonymity. 
Proof. Fig. 2 contains pseudo code for k-Same-furthest. 
The proposed algorithm de-identifies original faces as the 
center of various face clusters. For each cluster center 
calculated,  (when || is a multiple of 2) or more (when || is 
not a multiple of 2) copies of the same center are added to , 
making the   or more copies in   indistinguishable. Or in 
other words,  satisfies k-anonymity and always guarantees a 
recognition rate less than 1/. Theorem 1 is proved. 
Furthermore, lines 38, 39, 42 and 44 ensure that each copy 
of a cluster center in  has a one-to-one correspondence to an 
original face in . Therefore, 1) || = ||; and 2) for each 
original face in  there exists a de-identified face in . 
Theorem 2. Let CDEEEEF  be the average of a cluster #D  of G 
faces and CDH1EEEEEEEEEF the average of #DH1  which consists of #D 
and a face IF ∈ . #D ∩  = ∅. If IF is the closest face in set 
 to CDEEEEF, there cannot exit any other face in  that is closer 
to CDH1EEEEEEEEEF than IF. 
Proof. Because CDH1EEEEEEEEEF = 	
L
MNL-IF + G ∙ CDEEEEF. , CDEEEEF , CDH1EEEEEEEEEF  and IF 
are points on the same line in the feature space where  is 
defined, and CDH1EEEEEEEEEF lies between CDEEEEF and IF. Fig. 4 illustrates the 
geometric relationships among CDEEEEF, CDH1EEEEEEEEEF and IF, assuming  is 
defined in a 2D space. 
Let PD  be a sphere with a center at CDEEEEF  and a radius of 
3CDEEEEF − IF3  and PDH1  be a sphere with a center at CDH1EEEEEEEEEF  and a 
radius of 3CDH1EEEEEEEEEF − IF3. Since CDEEEEF, CDH1EEEEEEEEEF and IF are on the same line 
with CDH1EEEEEEEEEF lying between CDEEEEF and IF , hence PDH1 ⊂ PD . PD  and 
PDH1 are the solid and dotted circles in Fig. 4, respectively. 
Let RF ∈  be any other face than IF (from set ). Since IF is 
the closest face in set  to CDEEEEF, hence RF ∉ PD. Because PDH1 ⊂
PD, also hence RF ∉ PDH1, meaning RF is further away from CDH1EEEEEEEEEF 
than IF . Theorem 2 is proved. Note that there can be faces 
within CD that are closer to CDH1EEEEEEEEEF than IF. 
Theorem 3. If  is a person-specific face set,  is a privacy 
constraint,  > 1 , ||  2 ,  = k-Same-furthest,  , 
k-Same-furthest,   uses distU1 , 	U8  to measure the 
identity distance between any two faces U1  and 	U8 , and 
Γ ∈ , there cannot exist any face recognition software that 
measures identity distance with distU1, 	U8 to correctly match 
Γ with the subject of its original face in . 
Proof. Since #DH1 is composed of #D and IF and Theorem 2 
states that no other face in  can be closer to CDH1EEEEEEEEEF than IF, the 
face that is closest to CDH1EEEEEEEEEF must be a member of #DH1. In other 
words, the face that is closest to the average of a cluster must 
be a member of that cluster when clusters are formed in the 
way described in Theorem 2, i.e. selecting the face that is to 
closest the current average and adding it to the cluster. This is 
exactly the way how k-Same-furthest forms its clusters (lines 
11-12 and 20-21). However, k-Same-furthest  forms two 
clusters simultaneously, meaning #D in Theorem 2 is the union 
of #$  and #(  in k-Same-furthest. A member in #(  can only 
be the closest face to the average of #$  when there is 
overlapping between #(  and #$ , and vice versa. Since 
k-Same-furthest (lines 14 and 23 in Fig. 2) ensures that no 
overlapping is allowed between #$  and #( , among the 
remaining original faces the face that is closest to the average 
of #$  must be a member of #$  according to Theorem 2, and 
vice versa. As k-Same-furthest  never de-identifies the 
members of a cluster as the average of that cluster, the de-
identified faces (average of this cluster) can never be matched 
with their corresponding original faces (faces rather than 
members of this cluster), as long as the matching process uses 
the same distance measure as k-Same-furthest. Theorem 3 is 
proved. Theorem 3 means that as long as the recognition 
software uses the same distance measure as itself, 
k-Same-furthest  guarantees to thwarts face recognition 
software for every face in its  and therefore the best k-Same 
solution in terms of privacy protection. 
 
Fig. 4. Illustration of Theorem 2 in a 2D space. 
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Fig. 5. Example face images from the IMM dataset 
 
 Fig. 6. Recognition rates for de-identified faces aginst original.  
IV. EXPERIMENTS 
A. Dataset 
Experiments in this work were conducted with the IMM 
dataset [13], which contains images of 40 subjects. Only 
images with a near-frontal pose were used. These include a 
neutral, a happy and an arbitrary expression face images per 
subject. There is variation in head pose among the neutral as 
well as the happy faces. There is variation in both pose and 
lighting among the arbitrary expression faces. Fig. 5 shows 
some example face images from the IMM dataset. 
B. Test Design 
Privacy protection ability of the proposed k-Same-furthest 
algorithm is measured through recognition experiments using 
Eigenface technique and the Eigenface equivalent in the AAM 
space (i.e. that is used in k-Same-furthest). Cropped face 
images showing only the region inside the outline of the AAM-
fitted shape are used in the experiments. 70% of the subjects 
are used for training the Eigenface or the AAM space with 
cropped original images. In testing, all cropped original images 
with various expressions are used as the gallery and the de-
identified images as the probes. All results reported are based 
on randomly selecting ten different training and gallery/probe 
sets and computing the average recognition rate over all 
configurations. 
C. k-Same-furthest Outperforms k-Same-closest 
Fig. 6 shows the rank-1 recognition rates for the cropped 
original faces and the faces de-identified using either k-Same-
M or the proposed k-Same-furthest. As shown in Fig. 6, when 
the same distance measure is used, k-Same-furthest always 
produces a recognition rate of zero. When PCA representation 
of face images is used the face recognition software, the 
recognition rates of the k-Same-furthest de-identified faces are 
slightly above zero whilst stay far lower than k-Same-M faces. 
When the face recognition software represents faces as AAM 
parameters, the recognition rates of the faces de-identified by 
k-Same-M remain around 2-3% below the theoretical 
maximum of 1/. When PCA representation is used by the 
face recognition software, the recognition rates of the k-Same-
M faces is lower than those calculated by the AAM-based 
recognition but still stay much higher than the recognition rate 
achieved by k-Same-furthest. Regardless of which feature 
space the recognition software uses to represent face images, 
the recognition rate of the k-Same-M faces always stay 
synchronized with the theoretical maximum of 1/ . This 
forces k-Same-M to use large k’s in order to achieve decent 
privacy protection. With k-Same-furthest, the recognition rate 
stay at zero or slightly above zero, allowing decent privacy 
protection to be achievable with small k’s. This means that for 
a required level of privacy protection, k-Same-furthest requires 
a smaller k than k-Same-closest and in turn delivers a better 
discrimination among faces in the de-identified face set. After 
all, there are k copies of each face in the set. 
Fig. 7 displays the visual results of the proposed k-Same-
furthest algorithm with various values of k for three different 
expression faces of the same individual. Here expression of the 
original is preserved by forming clusters only with the original 
faces displaying the same expression. Since each original face 
in Fig. 7 is the first face to be de-identified, the same face will 
always be selected as Λ(1 (line 7 in Fig. 2) regardless of k and 
the selected Λ(1 is the furthest face to it over the entire face 
gallery. The cluster of faces that is used to de-identify it is the 
cluster of k faces that are closest to face Λ(1. Since Λ(1 is the 
same regardless of k, nearly identical de-identified faces are 
generated by k-Same-furthest for each original face in Fig. 7 
over various values of k. When the original face is not the first 
to de-identify the face that is furthest away from it over the 
entire face gallery might have already been taken by the 
previously formed clusters. As a result, a different Λ(1  and 
hence a different de-identified face will be generated for 
different k values.  
Fig. 8 displays the visual results of the proposed k-Same-
furthest algorithm where no preservation of data utility is 
implemented and hence the entire image gallery containing 
faces with various expressions and head poses is used to form 
the face clusters. The de-identified faces generated with various 
values of k display various expressions and head poses but a 
nearly identical identity. When k is small the de-identified 
faces tend to display an expression and a head pose of an 
extreme from the gallery. As k increases, the cluster on which 
the de-identified face is based becomes more and more diverse. 
As a result, the de-identified face converges to the average of 
the half gallery that is further to the original. 
As displayed in Figs. 7 and 8, the de-identified faces for 
each original appear significantly different to their 
corresponding originals.  
V. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
This paper refers to k-Same-Pixel/-Eigen and all their 
current extensions as the k-Same-closest algorithms and has 
pointed out that they share the fundamental drawback of de-
identifying faces based on faces closest to them. This means 
that the k-Same-closest algorithms are actually trying to 
minimize identity loss instead of maximising it and restricts the 
k-Same-closest algorithms to achieve decent privacy protection 
at the cost of large values of k, which in turn lead to the 
demand for a large image gallery or otherwise lack of 
discrimination among the de-identified faces (number of 
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distinctive faces in the de-identified face set is equal to or less 
than size of the gallery divided by k). 
In contrast to k-Same-closest algorithms, the proposed k-
Same-furthest algorithm de-identifies faces based on the faces 
that are furthest away from them and hence maximizes identity 
loss, achieving the perfect privacy protection regardless of the 
value of k. 
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Fig. 7. Visual results of the proposed algorithm with expression of the 
original is preserved by forming clusters only with the original faces 
displaying the same expression. 
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Fig. 8. Visual results of the proposed algorithm where the entire image 
gallery containing faces with various expressions and head poses is used to 
form the face clusters. 
 
